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In this paper, we study to what extent inconsistent feedback signals about performance affect 
firm adaptive behavior in terms of changes made to research-and-development (R&D) invest-
ments. We argue that inconsistency in performance feedback—based on discrepancies between 
two distinct performance signals—affects the degree to which such investments will be changed. 
Our aim is to show that accounting for inconsistent performance feedback is necessary as pre-
dictions for the direction of change in R&D investments based on the individual performance 
feedback signals are contradictory. Furthermore, we contribute by proposing a holistic consid-
eration mechanism as an alternative to the selective attention mechanism previously applied to 
inconsistent performance feedback. Our findings show that the impact of inconsistency depends 
on the exact configuration of the underlying performance feedback signal discrepancies. While 
consistently negative performance feedback signals would amplify their impact in stimulating 
increased R&D investments, inconsistent performance feedback signals created more nuanced 
effects. Having lower performance compared to an industry-based peer group—despite doing 
well compared to the previous year—made firms decrease their R&D investments. For the 
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opposite case of inconsistent performance feedback, we did not find an effect on change in R&D 
investments. These findings support to a degree our contention that explaining the effects of 
inconsistent performance feedback requires a holistic consideration theoretical mechanism 
instead of one involving selective attention. In sum, these findings suggest future research 
should take into account the differences between distinct instances of inconsistent performance 
feedback.
Keywords: performance feedback; inconsistency; behavioral theory of the firm; R&D
Organizational decision makers commonly strive to enhance the survival of their firms 
and achieve desired levels of performance. In circumstances where this does not occur, they 
seek ways to get their firm back on track. One of the strategies at their disposal is to invest in 
research and development (R&D). R&D is a vital step on the path toward the successful 
launch of innovations (Crépon, Duguet, & Mairesse, 1998; Greve, 2003a), even though in the 
short run it is a cost and thus negatively impacts accounting performance indicators, such as 
return on assets (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012). Innovations are impactful to 
firms in ensuring their continued existence and achieving above-average performance (for a 
recent meta-analysis, see Bowen, Rostami, & Steel, 2010). Given the benefits that can be 
gained from innovation, the normative implication for firm decision makers would be that 
they should strive to bring about innovation. As being innovative is by no means a matter of 
direct managerial choice, the amount of resources invested to that effect (R&D) is the pri-
mary way for decision makers to exert agency over the circumstances that foster innovation 
in their firms. Therefore, it becomes relevant to determine under what circumstances firms 
will increase or decrease their R&D expenditures.
The main focus in studies seeking to explain firm-level R&D spending has been on struc-
tural and environmental antecedents. Levin, Cohen, and Mowery (1985) showed that R&D 
intensity was higher in younger industries with a strong science base where the government 
invested substantially in technology. Cohen and Klepper (1992) compared the distribution of 
R&D intensities within industries and found that they are quite similar from one industry to 
the next. They argued that this implies within-industry variance in R&D intensity is driven 
by certain unobserved firm characteristics that are a function of features of the industry. Lee, 
Yoo, and Kwak (2011) demonstrated that among Korean firms, higher R&D activity was 
displayed by larger firms, firms receiving foreign direct investment, and firms experiencing 
conducive external industry conditions. Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) found that high levels of 
firm innovative activity tended to remain stable over time, while differences were found to 
be a matter of sector and firm size. In sum, factors driving rather stable levels of R&D among 
similar firms have been emphasized over the antecedents of within-firm variability in R&D 
intensity. Thus, the question of what stimulates an increase or decrease in R&D intensity has 
received less attention.
In this paper we seek to explain under what circumstances changes in R&D intensity at 
the firm level occur. Over and above the variance in R&D investment levels explained by the 
aforementioned structural and field level factors, there are particular firm-specific factors 
causing heterogeneity between firms to manifest over time. We take a behavioral approach 
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and conceptualize within-firm changes in R&D investment as a process of organizational 
adaptation. Specifically, we apply those behavioral theories linking feedback on organiza-
tional performance to organizational adaptation to explain changes in R&D investment lev-
els. These behavioral theories offer explanatory factors that vary on the firm level—feedback 
on organizational performance—to explain part of the heterogeneity in R&D intensity 
between firms occurring over time.
How performance feedback affects organizational adaptation is an important issue in stud-
ies on organization, management, and strategy (Argote & Greve, 2007). Several contribu-
tions to the literature (Greve 2003c, 2010; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005; Lant, Milliken, & 
Batra, 1992; Lant & Shapira, 2008; Milliken & Lant, 1991) have shown adaptation following 
performance feedback occurs in many organizational aspects, such as goal setting, expecta-
tion formation, evaluating alternative courses of action, and actual and impactful changes to 
organizational structures, procedures, and strategies. A few studies have already investigated 
how performance feedback affects R&D, yielding an empirical baseline we build on and 
advance (W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a; Salge, 2011; Vissa, Greve, 
& Chen, 2010). We discuss these studies in detail in our theory section and demonstrate that 
in sum, they amount to a partial insight into R&D investment decision making. We aim to 
advance our understanding of this key organizational decision.
We extend this line of work on performance feedback by focusing on the oftentimes 
implicitly acknowledged role of inconsistent performance feedback (Baum, Rowley, 
Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Greve, 1998). Inconsistent performance feedback means that the 
information available to the organization to evaluate its performance and determine whether 
or not to engage in adaptive behavior contains internal contradictions. These internal contra-
dictions matter because they make it hard to come to an unambiguous conclusion whether or 
not the organization is achieving a level of performance that compares favorably to its goals. 
For instance, a firm might have increased its market share yet saw the value of its sales 
decline in a given year. On the one hand, this firm might conclude that demand happened to 
be lower than usual in the current year, while its increase in market share shows its strategy 
is the right one. On the other hand, this firm might interpret the situation as one in which the 
market is becoming less interested in the current product range offered by the industry at 
large. In the latter situation, a firm would probably increase its R&D efforts seeking to 
develop products that better meet changed demands, while in the former situation, a firm 
would not reevaluate its R&D efforts. Based on this illustration of the countervailing pres-
sures exerted by inconsistent performance feedback, we put forward the following research 
question: To what extent does inconsistent performance feedback affect change in R&D 
investment?
By advancing existing theory on the impact of inconsistent performance feedback, we 
make our most important theoretical contribution. The literature so far has proposed two dia-
metrically opposed decision rules based on selective attention to one part of the performance 
feedback to capture the process by which decision makers resolve the ambiguity introduced 
by inconsistent performance feedback (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998). Departing from this 
selective attention theoretical mechanism, we propose an alternative decision rule, affordance-
urgency, based on a holistic consideration theoretical mechanism. We arrive at this after ques-
tioning the assumption behind the existing decision rules that all instances of inconsistent 
performance feedback will have the same effect. Inconsistent performance feedback is an 
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ambiguous situation. This ambiguity might be a trigger for holistic consideration of the per-
formance feedback. As a result of such more detailed evaluation of the performance feedback, 
decision makers could in the end conclude that despite the inconsistency between the signals, 
in combination they yield a coherent interpretation. The alternative mechanism we introduce 
encompasses exactly such holistic consideration. As such, we recognize that a broader range 
of responses to inconsistent performance feedback can occur than the literature currently 
accounts for. Hence, we primarily contribute to the literature on performance feedback and 
specifically to what impact inconsistency has on the performance feedback evaluation 
process.
Furthermore, our study makes two additional contributions to the literature on R&D and 
organizational performance feedback. First, studies using structural models report that levels 
of R&D intensity (R&D spending relative to sales) are rather stable over time and that most 
of the variance can be attributed to differences across industries (Máñez-Castillejo, Rochina-
Barrachina, Sanchis, & Sanchis, 2009; Peters, 2009). We contribute to this literature by 
exploring the sources of firm-level heterogeneity by building on behavioral theories of per-
formance feedback. Exploring such firm-level heterogeneity brings to the fore the circum-
stances that make firms change their level of R&D. Second, in behavioral theories on 
performance feedback, firms are described in rather generic terms, postulating that the pre-
dictions apply irrespective of industry, country, or other contextual aspects. Nevertheless, as 
will become clear from our review of the extant literature in the next section, most empirical 
studies in this tradition on R&D intensity sampled firms from a single industry or limited 
range of industries. Therefore, the current literature provides only partial insight into how 
performance feedback impacts R&D investment decision making. Limited generalizability 
of the findings is a key reason for this. Our study includes a very broad sample of firms from 
a larger variety of industries and countries than thus far used in a single study or in the sum 
of studies linking performance feedback to R&D. We thus contribute empirically by explor-
ing the external validity of theories on performance feedback. This puts the general applica-
bility of the theory to the test and will provide a better picture of its generalizability.
In the next section, we discuss the theoretical arguments linking performance feedback to 
adaptive behavior. In addition, we present hypotheses on how (inconsistent) performance 
feedback results in firm-level change in R&D investment. Next, we describe the details and 
outcomes of our empirical investigation of these hypotheses. Last, we discuss the implica-
tions of our findings, note the limitations of our study, and provide suggestions for further 
research on (inconsistent) performance feedback and R&D investment and innovation.
Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we give an overview of the existing literature on performance feedback. In 
particular, we focus on those contributions that studied adaptive behavior in terms of changes 
in R&D investment. Based on this overview, we formulate baseline hypotheses that reflect 
the commonly hypothesized and empirically corroborated relationships between perfor-
mance feedback and adaptive behavior. Furthermore, we focus on the subsection of the lit-
erature that included inconsistency in performance feedback and discuss predictions for its 
effect on adaptive behavior derived from the fire-alarm and self-enhancing rules. Our pri-
mary theoretical contribution concerns questioning a shared assumption underlying the two 
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decision rules and the selective attention mechanism they share—that all instances of incon-
sistent performance feedback will have the same consequence no matter the exact contradic-
tion in the performance feedback—resulting in the final hypothesis. In this final hypothesis, 
we allow for different cases of inconsistent performance feedback to have opposite conse-
quences. We derive these predictions from the holistic consideration (of all performance 
feedback signals) mechanism we introduce.
Performance Feedback and Firm-Level Change in R&D Investment
Starting from the seminal work of Cyert and March (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm, scholars have considered what role performance feedback plays in organizational 
behavior (Greve, 2003c; Lant & Montgomery, 1987). Performance feedback is an informa-
tion-generating mechanism in which realized performance is evaluated against an aspiration 
level—the value of performance which a (coalition of) decision maker(s) considers satisfy-
ing. The behavioral consequences of performance feedback do not derive from the firm max-
imizing performance but rather from the identification of the boundary between success and 
failure—in effect, the lowest level of performance decision makers find acceptable—and 
striving to attain at the very least a level of performance indicating success. Performance 
above the aspiration level is seen as a sign that the firm’s strategy, routines, and structure are 
in line with the demands of the firm’s environment, implying no radical changes are neces-
sary. Conversely, performance below the aspiration level indicates a mismatch between the 
firm’s strategy, routines, and structure and the demands placed on it by the firm’s environ-
ment and will result in (radical) changes being made. As it developed over time, this line of 
work has shown that the relationship between performance feedback and adaptation is a 
matter of degree and not just a question of being below or above the aspiration level (Greve, 
2003c; Lant & Montgomery, 1987). Most findings indicate that as performance increases 
relative to the aspiration level, the degree of changes made will decrease. This allows for 
some adaptation occurring in firms that did attain their aspiration level.
While there is no universal agreement regarding this in the literature, many studies argue 
and show organizational decision makers utilize multiple aspiration levels (W. Chen, 2008; 
W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003c; Salge, 2011). These aspiration levels are most com-
monly based on (a) aggregates of past performance and previous goal levels (historical aspi-
ration level) as well as (b) performance of a selection of salient competitors (social aspiration 
level) or weighted combinations of these two performance cues (Greve, 2003a, 2003c; Vissa 
et al., 2010). While they are both used to evaluate current firm performance, historical and 
social aspiration levels do involve information sources that differ in relevant respects (Baum 
et al., 2005). The historical aspiration level is self-referential and in most cases involves a 
gradual updating as information about firm performance is integrated over time. In contrast 
to such internally derived information, the social aspiration level involves externally derived 
information through contemporaneous comparison to other firms’ performance levels. These 
other firms are selected based on relevant similarity criteria, which in empirical studies gen-
erally involves all firms in the same industry (pending data availability and sampling).
While predictions and findings in the literature often indicate performance feedback based 
on these two aspiration levels have similar effects (Greve, 2003c), this is not universally the 
case. In studies on risk taking (K. Miller & Chen, 2004) and R&D intensity (W. Chen, 2008) 
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by publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms, it was shown that well-performing firms would 
be more likely to take risks the more favorably performance compared to prior firm perfor-
mance yet be less likely to do so in case performance was compared to performance levels of 
similar firms. In a study on similar firms from Japan, Jung and Bansal (2009) found an 
inverted-u-shape relationship between change in the degree of internationalization and per-
formance relative to the historical aspiration level, while for performance relative to the 
social aspiration level, the relationship was monotonically positive. Next to these notable 
discrepancies, studies on performance feedback have often shown that sometimes perfor-
mance relative to the historical aspiration level has an impact on adaptation, while perfor-
mance relative to the social aspiration level does not or vice versa (W. Chen & Miller, 2007; 
Greve, 2003b; Iyer & Miller, 2008). In addition, W. Chen (2008) stated that future research 
should account for both aspiration levels in order to differentiate their effects. Because we 
aim to advance the study of inconsistent performance feedback, minding these two differ-
ent—and potentially contradictory—sources of information to evaluate current organiza-
tional performance is vital.
Performance feedback is believed to lead to adaptation in a number of distinct organiza-
tional aspects, such as adjustment of the aspiration level, changes in the willingness to take 
risks, and problemistic search behavior (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve 2003c, 2010). In this 
paper, we focus on the latter, which is called thus as it occurs in response to problems sig-
naled by unsatisfactory performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003c). Problemistic 
search behavior can be seen as a process in which the firm reevaluates its strategy, routines, 
and structure and formulates one or more solutions believed to be better attuned to environ-
mental demands. As such, these solutions present viable routes to performance improvement 
and hence aspiration level attainment.
Several types of search behavior have been discerned in previous studies. Firms can 
search for and consider alternatives in how they market their products, structure their opera-
tions, stimulate and reward their employees, and many other areas. The most studied type of 
search behavior is technological search behavior (W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007; 
Greve, 2003a; Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Levinthal & March, 1981; Salge, 2011; Vissa et 
al., 2010). In practice and in most empirical studies, this concerns allocating resources to 
R&D activities. Investments in R&D therefore are a potential key behavioral consequence of 
performance feedback. However, relative to the attention devoted to risky, strategic decisions 
in the performance feedback literature, only a few studies (Antonelli, 1989; W. Chen, 2008; 
W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a; Salge, 2011; Vissa et al., 2010) have empirically 
studied this consequence of performance feedback.
While one could argue that investing in R&D is also an indication of a change in the will-
ingness to take risks next to being problemistic search behavior, there are a number of argu-
ments that counter this assertion. First of all, whether increased R&D investment is indicative 
of an increase in organizational risk is debatable (Grenadier & Weiss, 1997; Greve, 2003a; 
Wiseman, McNamara, & Devers, 2001). On the one hand, R&D has uncertain returns and 
thus investing a large amount of the organization’s resources could put it at risk. Moreover, 
in the short term, investing in R&D generally will have a negative impact on return on assets, 
implying a performance decrease. On the other hand, increased investment in R&D may 
reduce organizational risk as it increases the number of future options for what innovations 
to launch given expectations about expected returns and risks associated with these options 
(Christensen, 1997). Taken together, these arguments define competing risks—the short-term 
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performance risk versus the long-term risk of lagging behind in organizational renewal and 
losing market share—which actually cancel each other out. For this reason, arguments about 
an increase in the willingness to take risks are not applicable to R&D investment decisions. 
Furthermore, we focus on the adjustment of the level of R&D investment in response to per-
formance feedback rather than the specific level of such investments. Recent work by 
Kacperczyk, Beckman, and Moliterno (in press) illustrates that the question whether or not a 
particular strategic change following performance feedback is risky requires more nuanced 
theoretical discussion. While we argue that R&D investment changes cannot be equated with 
risk taking, Kacperczyk and colleagues demonstrate the same can apply to other common 
dependent variables in the organizational performance feedback literature.
In the current study, we conceptualize increasing R&D investment exclusively as prob-
lemistic search behavior. When performance feedback indicates the organization is not per-
forming at desired levels, problemistic search for solutions is necessary and in effect allows 
an organization to reduce the risk of further performance shortfalls and eventual organiza-
tional failure (Vissa et al., 2010). A firm that increases R&D expenditures when facing a 
performance shortfall could actually be balancing out the abovementioned short- and long-
term risks in such a way that the overall level of firm risk remains unchanged.
Applying the general performance feedback prediction outlined above, we can state that 
firms that find their current performance to be unsatisfactory in the light of their aspiration 
level(s) will increase their allocation of resources to R&D. Reflecting this, the common pre-
diction made in the literature regarding R&D is that firms will increase such investments the 
greater the negative discrepancy between current performance and aspiration level(s). 
Fragmented evidence for this prediction in relation to R&D intensity has been found in stud-
ies on the major players in the Japanese shipbuilding industry (Greve, 2003a), publicly listed 
U.S. manufacturing firms (W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007), and publicly listed 
Indian companies in various industries (Vissa et al., 2010). Additional evidence comes from 
studies on R&D investment levels of Italian manufacturing firms (Antonelli, 1989) as well as 
the number of ongoing R&D projects relative to the number of employees in English nonspe-
cialist public-sector hospital organizations (Salge, 2011).
Most of these studies employed both a historical (based on past organizational perfor-
mance) and a social aspiration level (based on peer group performance). In sum, they provide 
preliminary evidence that performance feedback theory applies in a broad range of industry 
and institutional settings. However, the cited studies each test the main prediction on a spe-
cific sample of organizations. Our study—by virtue of its multi-industry, multicountry sam-
ple of firms—contributes to the generalizability of performance feedback theory by including 
all of the commercial sectors and countries studied thus far in a single empirical study. This 
results in the two baseline hypotheses as to how firms will change their investments in R&D 
given performance feedback.1 In the remainder of this theory section, we will argue that in 
case performance feedback is inconsistent, these baseline hypotheses do not apply. This 
implies that the baseline hypotheses do apply in case of consistent performance feedback, 
meriting their inclusion in our model. The following are our baseline hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: The lower performance relative to the historical aspiration level becomes, the more 
firms will increase their R&D investments.
Hypothesis 1b: The lower performance relative to the social aspiration level becomes, the more 
firms will increase their R&D investments.
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Inconsistency in Performance Feedback
In the studies on the effect of performance–aspiration discrepancies and R&D we have 
discussed, effects of different performance feedback signals are treated either as independent 
(W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003c) or as additive signals (Greve, 
2003a; Vissa et al., 2010). In empirical analyses, they were sometimes treated as interchange-
able (W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007), while in other studies, only a single one is 
discussed and/or operationalized (Antonelli, 1989; Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Salge, 2011). 
This indicates an implicit assumption that decision makers approach performance feedback 
evaluation as a fragmentary process in which each signal used to evaluate current perfor-
mance is considered in isolation. We seek to question this assumption and propose an alterna-
tive, less atomistic treatment of performance feedback. This alternative treatment is meant to 
advance our understanding of how inconsistent performance feedback affects problemistic 
search behavior—and hence change in R&D investments. A number of authors have specifi-
cally called for studies of how organizations deal with contradictory performance feedback 
(Greve, 2003c; Salge, 2011). We aim to answer that call and start by discussing the few stud-
ies that did include inconsistent performance feedback. Interestingly, none of these studies 
focused on problemistic search behavior and thus investments in R&D.
The effects of inconsistency in performance feedback are discussed in the literature on 
multiple goals in performance feedback (Audia & Brion, 2007; Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 
1998, 2008; Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 2002). The presence of multiple goals implies that 
there are at least two aspiration levels to be considered. A direct consequence is that ambigu-
ity is introduced in evaluating realized performance. Quite likely, not all performance–aspi-
ration discrepancies will be in line with a single unequivocal evaluation of either success or 
failure. As a result, the subjective nature of performance evaluation becomes a relevant issue. 
Unfortunately, this part of performance feedback has not received much conceptual attention 
(Jordan & Audia, 2012). Hence, it is challenging to predict the direction and extent of orga-
nizational adaptation following such a muddled performance evaluation. The practical rele-
vance of multiple performance goals is illustrated in a study of letters to shareholders by the 
hand of CEOs in annual reports by Short and Palmer (2003). They found that these CEOs use 
multiple performance referents (aspiration levels in performance feedback theory terminol-
ogy) from a variety of sources to evaluate their company’s performance (Short & Palmer, 
2003). Applying this reasoning to the baseline model we discussed earlier, we observe that 
this model includes two aspiration levels—a historical and a social one—offering two sources 
of, potentially contradictory, information to evaluate performance.2
In Table 1 we visualize the different possible configurations of consistent and inconsistent 
performance feedback and indicate what predictions can be made given the two baseline 
hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). In case performance feedback is consistent 
(Configurations 1 and 4 in Table 1), performance feedback evaluation yields similar conclu-
sions for both historical and social aspiration levels, and thus predictions based on Hypotheses 
1a and 1b are identical. For the two instances of inconsistent performance feedback 
(Configurations 2 and 3 in Table 1), such predictions are direct opposites of each other as the 
two performance feedback evaluations yield contradictory conclusions. These two inconsis-
tent performance feedback configurations will be the topic of discussion in the remainder of 
this theory section.
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One could argue for a simple averaging out of the effects such that the larger perfor-
mance–aspiration discrepancy determines whether or not investment in R&D will increase or 
decrease or an extreme signal heuristic in which the performance signal most distant to its 
respective aspiration level takes precedence. However, it seems more likely that organiza-
tional decision makers will be triggered by the inconsistency in the performance feedback. In 
the following, we will discuss the mechanisms from the performance feedback literature that 
have been or could be applied to inconsistent performance feedback. A first sort of response 
that might occur is inertia: Decision makers could wait for more performance feedback to 
arrive given that there is no clear-cut success-failure conclusion to be made. When facing 
ambiguous, inconsistent performance feedback, decision makers might feel confused and 
refrain from making changes to R&D investments (Milliken & Lant, 1991). However, from 
the few studies on inconsistent performance feedback, the conclusion is that decision makers 
do not let inconsistent performance feedback preclude them from engaging in adaptive 
behavior (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 2008).
The commonly used theoretical mechanism explaining responses to inconsistent feedback 
involves decision rules. In accordance with the heuristics literature, decision rules are con-
ceptualized as shortcuts in information processing decision makers use to deal with complex, 
cognitively challenging situations (Greve, 2003c). Inconsistent performance feedback repre-
sents such a situation. In the following, we discuss the two diametrically opposed decision 
rules proposed in the literature—the fire-alarm and self-enhancing decision rules—and apply 
them to firm-level change in R&D investments. Both assume that decision makers will be 
selective in what part of the performance feedback they pay attention to in order to reduce the 
level of complexity they are facing (Baum et al., 2005; Jordan & Audia, 2012). As mentioned 
before, we propose an alternative to this selective attention mechanism—holistic consider-
ation of the entirety of the performance feedback information—postulating a more elaborate 
fashion in which we believe decision makers will handle the ambiguity introduced by incon-
sistent performance feedback. This alternative mechanism represents the key theoretical 
Table 1
Performance Feedback Configurations
Performance Declined Relative to the 
Social Aspiration Level
Performance Increased Relative to the 
Social Aspiration Level
Performance declined relative to 
the historical aspiration level
(1)  Consistently negative performance 
feedback
(2)  Inconsistent performance 
feedback
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b: 
Increase in R&D investment
Hypothesis 1a: Increase in R&D 
investment
 Hypothesis 1b: Decrease in R&D 
investment
Performance increased relative 
to the historical aspiration 
level
(3)  Inconsistent performance 
feedback
(4)  Consistently positive performance 
feedback
Hypothesis 1a: Decrease in R&D 
investment
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b: 
Decrease in R&D investment
Hypothesis 1b: Increase in R&D 
investment
 
Note: R&D = research and development.
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advancement we introduce to the performance feedback literature. Based on holistic consid-
eration, we propose an alternative decision rule: the affordance-urgency rule. With the empir-
ical findings emerging from our study in hand, we can determine which of these mechanisms 
best explains firm-level change in R&D investments.
The two studies that empirically accounted for inconsistency in performance feedback 
(Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998) made reference to two decision rules, the fire-alarm rule 
and the self-enhancing rule.3 These decision rules describe a cognitive shortcut whereby 
decision makers transform a situation of inconsistent performance feedback through selec-
tive attention to one that is more like a consistent performance feedback situation and act 
accordingly (i.e., follow the logic underlying the baseline model as included in Hypotheses 
1a and 1b). They do so by focusing on the most relevant performance–aspiration discrepancy 
and proceeding as if the other one need not be factored into their decision or does not exist at 
all—that is, paying selective attention to a subset of the performance feedback signals (Audia 
& Brion, 2007; Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998, 2008; Jordan & Audia, 2012; Mezias et al., 
2002). Thus, given similar performance feedback (either Configuration 2 or 3 in Table 1), the 
effects of performance feedback on subsequent R&D levels can be strikingly different 
depending on the decision rule employed. Therefore, inconsistent performance feedback is a 
good candidate to explain firm-level heterogeneity in R&D investments over time.
First, decision makers could operate according to a fire-alarm rule (Baum et al., 2005; 
Greve, 1998). This implies their attention is drawn most strongly to the performance–aspira-
tion discrepancy that indicates a problem, in effect the one that is negative. The positive 
performance–aspiration discrepancy is deemed of no or far lesser relevance. As such, the 
fire-alarm rule is a rather straightforward extension of the baseline model to inconsistent 
performance feedback since decision makers still operate as problem solvers (Jordan & 
Audia, 2012) motivated by the desire to reduce any and all negative discrepancies between 
current versus desired outcomes (Audia & Brion, 2007). Any performance signal indicating 
a problem triggers a reevaluation of the firm’s strategy, routines, and structure—even if it 
occurs simultaneously with a positive performance signal (Baum et al., 2005). This fits with 
the sequential attention-to-goals argument of Cyert and March (1963) stating that an aspira-
tion–performance discrepancy becomes and remains relevant only insofar that it indicates a 
problem—that is, when it is negative (Greve, 2003c, 2008). As such, decision makers remain 
temporarily consistent in their standards of evaluation (Jordan & Audia, 2012) and continue 
striving to correct any negative performance–aspiration discrepancy (Baum et al., 2005). 
Based on the fire-alarm rule, one would thus predict an increase in R&D investments the 
greater the negative performance–aspiration discrepancy.
Second, decision makers might follow a self-enhancing rule. If they do, they focus on the 
positive performance–aspiration discrepancy and neglect the negative one. This represents a 
departure from the logic underlying the baseline model, in that decision makers employing 
this decision rule no longer function as problem solvers but rather seek to enhance their own 
self-image (Jordan & Audia, 2012). People in general are characterized to a smaller or larger 
degree by a need to see themselves in a positive light (Audia & Brion, 2007). Firm decision 
makers generally strive to be evaluated as competent and successful. Because they are archi-
tects of the firm’s strategy, routines, and structure, evaluation of the firm’s performance 
implies evaluation of their own personal competence and success. Furthermore, especially 
negative performance feedback can cause decision makers to feel threatened and insecure 
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about their careers. The more they feel they have a personal stake in the firm’s decisions, the 
more self-enhancement will affect evaluation of the firm’s performance (Jordan & Audia, 
2012). Additionally, human beings more easily process positive evaluations than negative 
ones and attribute failure to external circumstances rather than their own behavior.
Reflecting these mostly psychological arguments, self-enhancement does seem likely 
when inconsistent performance feedback occurs. The negative performance–aspiration dis-
crepancy can easily be the source of threat, while the more easily processed positive one 
allows decision makers to portray their actions in a positive light. While this line of reasoning 
illustrates that self-enhancement can occur in case performance feedback is inconsistent, that 
does not necessarily mean it will. Jordan and Audia (2012) stated that whether or not self-
enhancement tendencies of individual decision makers actually manifest themselves in firm-
level decisions is a function of the latitude to portray performance in a positive light being 
present. The more complex the decision task, which clearly applies to inconsistent perfor-
mance feedback, the greater this latitude. Moreover, the ambiguous nature of inconsistent 
performance feedback makes it a situation in which decision makers will be prone to self-
enhancement (Audia & Brion, 2007).
Jordan and Audia (2012) highlighted three strategies of dealing with performance feed-
back that reflect self-enhancement. The most applicable one to inconsistent performance 
feedback is the possibility to retroactively revise the priority of performance goals. Whereas 
decision makers operating as problem solvers (as the fire-alarm rule espouses) would remain 
temporarily consistent in how they evaluate performance feedback, those operating as self-
enhancers will take ambiguity in performance signals as an opportunity to redefine standards 
of evaluation. A second applicable one is that in this sort of situation, they can invoke coun-
terfactual outcomes as a standard of comparison instead of the actual ones (Jordan & Audia, 
2012). In effect, this is a glass-half-full/glass-half-empty situation in which the decision mak-
ers might claim that had they not followed the firm’s strategy, both performance–aspiration 
discrepancies would be negative instead of just the one. Inconsistent performance feedback 
is then actually redefined as an indication of success rather than one equally indicative of 
success and failure. The use of these sorts of strategies makes decision makers emphasize the 
positive performance–aspiration discrepancy over the negative one. Therefore, the self-
enhancing rule predicts a decrease in search behavior the greater the positive performance–
aspiration discrepancy.
Empirical evidence on which of the decision rules applies to inconsistency between per-
formance relative to a historical and social aspiration level is scarce, though the study by 
Baum and coauthors (2005) on Canadian investment banks’ partnering choices supports the 
fire-alarm rule. However, Greve’s (1998) study on format choices by U.S. radio broadcasters 
did not find a significant effect of inconsistency at all. Next to these results not being mutu-
ally supporting, they apply to different dependent variables than we study—though they 
entail some sort of strategic change similar to the one we consider. Which of the two decision 
rules best explains changes in R&D investments following inconsistent performance feed-
back is therefore still an empirically relevant question. Thus, we propose the following two 
competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a (fire-alarm rule): If performance feedback is inconsistent (Configurations 2 and 3 in 
Table 1), the lower the negative performance–aspiration discrepancy, the more firms will 
increase their R&D investments.
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Hypothesis 2b (self-enhancing rule): If performance feedback is inconsistent (Configurations 2 and 
3 in Table 1), the higher the positive performance–aspiration, the more firms will decrease their 
R&D investments.
While the decision rules just discussed involve decision makers’ neglecting half of the 
performance feedback information available, one could imagine that they try and make sense 
of what the two apparently contradictory signals imply when considered in combination. 
With regard to problemistic search, an oft-repeated characterization of that process includes 
the assumption that search starts in the proximity of the problem area identified. Furthermore, 
what sort of solutions receive attention is informed by the problem diagnosis (Cyert & March, 
1963; Greve, 2003c; Vissa et al., 2010). Decision makers bring to bear their previous experi-
ences, insights into their industry, and other knowledge to the table (Gavetti et al., 2012). 
These factors may bias or enhance their interpretation of performance feedback and conclu-
sion as to whether it indicates a problem and what sort of problem that may be. As contem-
porary organizations are often asked to satisfy multiple, in all likelihood competing goals 
(Greve, 2003c; Short & Palmer, 2003), they probably develop some kind of higher-order 
decision rule or metacognitive strategy to make sense of contradictory information. With 
such tools in place, decision makers acquire cognitive templates used to resolve the ambigu-
ity created by contradictory performance feedback signals. This particular line of reasoning 
has not been thoroughly considered in the performance feedback literature to our 
knowledge.
We explore this alternative line of reasoning and propose how holistic consideration 
would affect change in R&D investments following inconsistent performance feedback. 
Strategic choice is driven not only by motivation but also by whether a decision maker 
believes there are proper opportunities to do so and the organization has the capabilities to 
utilize them (M. Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007). Thus, while the performance feedback literature 
generally discusses what sort of performance feedback signals generate the motivation to 
change (Greve, 1998, 2003c), it might be useful to also consider managerial interpretations 
of performance feedback in terms of the presence of opportunities and capabilities to increase 
future organizational performance.
The classical entrepreneurial “logic” (D. Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011) could 
serve as a potential cognitive template that does provide straightforward guidelines to draw 
sensible conclusions from inconsistent performance feedback. This consideration is espe-
cially applicable to one of the inconsistent performance feedback situations. When the his-
torical performance discrepancy is positive and the social one negative (Configuration 3 in 
Table 1), decision makers face a situation in which the fact that their competitors on average 
achieve higher performance demonstrates that there are opportunities to improve their own 
performance. Increasing R&D investments is a suitable strategy for firms intending to appro-
priate such opportunities (Antonelli, 1989). Greve (1998) indicates that next to providing a 
source of information to evaluate firm performance, other firms may also signal market 
opportunities worth exploring. We build on this by asserting that the former—in case com-
peting firms are performing better than the focal firm—can inform the firm that the latter—
market opportunities worth pursuing—exists. Moreover, these firms are experiencing a 
positive trend in performance, and therefore they can come to the conclusion that they also 
have the means and thus the capability to act upon those opportunities. This may instill 
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confidence and the ambition to adjust goals upward (Baum et al., 2005). The actual presence 
of resources over and above those needed to ensure the organization can continue operat-
ing—organizational slack—has consistently been shown to increase the level of R&D invest-
ments (W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a; Vissa et al., 2010).
Combining these elements of urgency to act and being able to afford taking action, an 
affordance-urgency decision rule implies increasing R&D investment in this particular con-
figuration of inconsistent performance feedback. The study of Salge (2011) on English non-
specialist public-sector hospitals offers some insight into whether the logic underlying this 
decision rule holds. He found a positive interaction effect between performance–aspiration 
discrepancy (based on a social aspiration level) and organizational slack, that is, hospitals 
that lagged behind their competitors while simultaneously possessing high levels of slack 
resources would have more R&D projects relative to the number of employees than hospitals 
with low levels of slack. In contrast, when firms are performing at a higher level than the 
average competitor (Configuration 2 in Table 1), the opposite is the case. First, there is no 
sense of urgency to be felt but rather a potential argument for being content with the status 
quo as the firm evidently has seized all market opportunities worth pursuing as can be con-
cluded from being ahead of the competition. Combined with the fact that experiencing a 
negative trend in performance of the organization reduces the availability of resources to take 
strategic action, in this case, the affordance-urgency decision rule would predict a decrease 
in R&D investments. On the basis of these arguments, we propose the final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (affordance-urgency rule): In case performance feedback is inconsistent, the further 
above the historical aspiration level and the further below the social aspiration level performance 
is, the more firms will increase their R&D investments.
Methods
We use data from the 2010 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (European 
Commission, 2010) to test our hypotheses. This scorecard, composed by two research orga-
nizations of the European Union (the Joint Research Centre and the Research Directorates-
General of the European Commission), ranked European Union (EU) firms in terms of their 
investment in R&D and compared them to non-EU firms also ranked in terms of their R&D 
expenditures. In total, data on 1,000 EU and 1,000 non-EU firms were available.4 Data 
mainly concerned the 2009 fiscal year on which the ranking was based but also included 
measures pertaining to 2008, 2007, and 2006. For details on the compilation procedure, we 
refer to Annex 3 of the report (European Commission, 2010).
Our theoretical interest concerns the effect of performance feedback on firm-level change 
in R&D investments. Below, we will explain in detail how we operationalized these con-
structs respectively in terms of sales growth and R&D intensity change. As the firms were 
selected for the scorecard based on the monetary value of their 2009 R&D expenditures, we 
checked the distribution of values for the 2009 and 2008 R&D intensity measures. We found 
that a few rather extreme outliers were present in the data set. A scatter plot of these two 
variables showed that firms that had a value of 300% or higher for either of these measures 
deviated markedly from the general pattern of strong positive correlation. We excluded these 
firms as it is likely that unique firm-specific events rather than performance feedback led to 
such extreme year-to-year deviations in R&D intensity. In a second step, we consulted annual 
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reports, company websites, and/or press releases to determine what occurred for firms that 
showed absolute changes of 200% or higher of sales in 2007 and/or 2008. Some of these 
firms were excluded, with reasons for doing so being structural changes, like mergers and 
acquisitions, and unique events that led to a discontinuity in sales. Beyond the already named 
reasons for exclusion based on extreme values in R&D intensity or sales-level changes, 
another motivation for taking these steps is that in all likelihood, the excluded firms were not 
seen as relevant to compare performance with by the other firms in our sample. These steps 
reduced our sample to 1,922 firms.
Measures
As dependent variable—R&D intensity change—we used the difference between the 
R&D intensity (R&D investments / Net sales) values provided for the fiscal years 2009 and 
2008. Thus, our dependent variable represents the extent to which R&D investments (relative 
to firm size) were increased or decreased.
We constructed two performance–aspiration discrepancy measures to serve as indepen-
dent variables. Following earlier studies (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998), we used a mea-
sure of the historical and the social aspiration levels. Both performance feedback measures 
were based on net sales growth. Historical performance discrepancy was calculated by sub-
tracting the historical aspiration level (percentage sales growth from 2006 to 2007) from the 
firm’s performance (percentage sales growth from 2007 to 2008).
Social performance discrepancy was calculated by subtracting the social aspiration level 
(average percentage sales growth from 2007 to 2008 for all other firms in the industry the 
firm was active in) from the firm’s performance (percentage sales growth from 2007 to 
2008). We used all available other firms in the industry to calculate the social aspiration level 
(out of the 1,922 left after the above exclusions were made), even if some of these firms used 
for comparison needed to be excluded from the actual analyses later on due to missing data. 
This procedure is most commonly used in the empirical literature to capture average perfor-
mance of the peer reference group (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998). By using this procedure, 
we select firms that also devote substantial amounts of funds to R&D and are in most cases 
also among the larger firms in their industry. Therefore, they should be rather visible to other 
firms in the industry besides facing rather similar competitive environments. For 39 firms, no 
data were available to calculate the social aspiration level, while the historical aspiration 
level could not be calculated for a further 49 firms for the same reason. This reduced our 
sample to 1,834 firms.
As noted in the introduction, previous work has focused on a structural explanation for 
differences in levels of R&D. As we aim to show that (in)consistent performance feedback 
matters on top of such more stable, structural antecedents, we need to account for such 
structural aspects. First of all, we controlled for industry. Given that we also used this 
industry variable to determine which firms were relevant to construct the social aspiration 
level, we needed to make sure the number of firms per sector was not too small. The firms 
in the database were classified using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) system, 
which like the Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté 
européenne (NACE) and the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) systems has four 
levels of increased specificity (one-, two-, three-, or four-digit sector classification). Firms 
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were generally classified at the three-digit level, yielding 45 unique sectors. Some of these 
included fewer than 10 firms, so we condensed the classification prior to calculating social 
aspiration levels to 25 sectors as follows. In case a sector included at least 100 firms, we 
did not aggregate. In case the sector included less than 100 firms, we aggregated up to the 
two-digit level until at least 50 firms were represented in a sector or no meaningful aggre-
gation was possible (for instance, for the media and travel-and-leisure industries). The 
bank, insurance, and other financial sectors were merged up to the one-digit level, as these 
were sparsely populated even at the two-digit level. We added a number of industry dum-
mies to our analyses equal to the number of sectors minus 1. We used the retail industry as 
the excluded category and hence the comparison industry.
As our data included firms from all over the world, we also controlled for where the firms 
were headquartered to accommodate cross-region macroeconomical, legal, and institutional 
differences.5 These data were provided at the country level, yielding 46 unique countries of 
which, again, quite a number were sparsely represented. We condensed these into 13 regions 
based on a classification provided by the United Nations (UN) Statistics Division (2011). We 
deviated in two instances to obtain sufficient aggregation. We categorized a firm headquar-
tered in the Cayman Islands as North America instead of the Caribbean and merged a firm 
headquartered in South Africa with eight located in Brazil into a single category. While the 
latter category includes firms from two different continents, both are headquartered in coun-
tries that are often grouped together as emerging economies undergoing rapid economic 
development (BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, and China] countries) and have similar legal and 
institutional features. Furthermore, as Taiwan is not a UN member, it is not included in the 
classification scheme we used. We chose to include Taiwan in the same category as China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea (eastern Asia). We added a number of region dummies 
to our analyses equal to the number of regions minus 1. We used North America as the 
excluded category and hence the comparison region.
As a last structural feature, we controlled for organizational size by including the number 
of employees in 2009. We log-transformed this variable because the distribution of the num-
ber of employees of the firms represented in our sample was right skewed. As a result of 84 
cases with missing data on one of the control variables, our final sample included 1,750 
firms.
Model and Analyses
As is common practice in performance feedback studies, we employed splined regression 
to be able to detect changes in sensitivity to performance feedback around the aspiration 
levels (Greve, 2003c). Thus, we will include two coefficients for both performance–aspira-
tion discrepancy variables. The first takes the value of the nonsplined variable if this is 
smaller than zero, and zero otherwise. The second takes the value of the nonsplined variable 
if this is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. Effectively, for each of the performance–
aspiration discrepancy variables, we model the negative and positive range of values using 
separate variables. The first describes the effect on the dependent variable for an increase in 
performance toward the as-yet-not-attained aspiration level. The second does the same but 
then for an increase in performance beyond the already attained aspiration level. Prior to 
performing the spline procedure, we divided both performance–aspiration discrepancy mea-
sures by 100 in order to obtain interpretable regression coefficients.
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As we aim to investigate the effect of inconsistent performance feedback as opposed to 
consistent performance feedback, we also calculated the interactions between the four per-
formance variables (Baum et al., 2005). Three of these will take a value of zero as two of the 
underlying values that are multiplied to yield the performance feedback interaction variables 
are zero as a result of the splined regression approach.
To test our hypotheses we employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. To account for 
heteroskedasticity, standard errors were clustered by industry in these models. All statistical 
tests were two tailed.
Results
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables included in our 
analyses, excluding industry and region dummies. The pattern of correlation between our 
variables is in line with what would be expected based on our baseline hypotheses (Hypotheses 
1a and 1b). Both performance discrepancy measures had a significantly negative correlation 
with the dependent variable R&D intensity change. Moreover, the two performance–aspira-
tion variables were correlated, but not extremely so, indicating they do communicate distinct 
information regarding organizational success and failure to the decision maker. Last, organi-
zational size was not strongly correlated with change in R&D intensity. It did however have 
a weak, positive correlation to both performance–aspiration comparisons, indicating that 
larger firms were slightly more likely to also be better performing firms.
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS regression analyses for R&D intensity change. To 
prevent unnecessary cluttering, we do not report individual coefficients for the industry and 
region dummies.6 Since we controlled for industry and geographical region, the results we 
present apply across this broad range of firms. Model 1 includes only the control variables. 
Model 2 adds the splined performance–aspiration discrepancy coefficients. Model 3 adds the 
performance–aspiration discrepancy interaction coefficients. In each model, an increasing 
proportion of the variance in R&D intensity change is explained. We observe that firm size, 
as indicated by the number of employees in 2009 (log-transformed), did not impact R&D 
intensity change corroborating the picture emerging from the correlations in Table 1. Models 
2 and 3 are of substantive interest to us. In Model 2, all performance discrepancy coefficients 
are in the expected, negative direction except for the positive social performance discrepancy 
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable M SD 1 2 3
1. Number of employees 2009 (log) 9.31 1.51  
2. Historical performance discrepancy (/100) −0.03 0.05 .07**  
3. Social performance discrepancy (/100) −0.02 0.05 .06* .41***  
4. R&D intensity change 0.33 1.35 .04 −.20*** −.14***
Note: N = 1,750. R&D = research and development.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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coefficient. However, none of these coefficients reaches significance. As both historical per-
formance–aspiration discrepancy coefficients pointed in the same direction, we further 
explore this result by estimating the model without the splined coefficients. In Table 4, the 
results of this additional model (Model 4) are presented. In Model 4, the coefficient for his-
torical aspiration–performance discrepancy is negative and significant, indicating that if 
annual sales growth in 2009 would decline by 100% relative to 2008, R&D intensity would 
increase by 7.38 percentage points. This result fits Hypothesis 1a as it indicates that the less 
favorably performance compares against previous firm performance, the more firms will 
increase their R&D intensity.
Table 3
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of R&D Intensity Change
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant −5.15 (5.30) −6.17 (4.57) −6.45 (4.64)
Number of employees 2009 (log) 0.46 (0.49) 0.50 (0.38) 0.50 (0.37)
Sector dummies Included Included Included
Region dummies Included Included Included
Historical performance discrepancy (<0) −5.11 (4.68) 2.23 (1.57)
Historical performance discrepancy (>0) −13.02 (8.12) 15.00 (10.89)
Social performance discrepancy (<0) −5.99 (5.01) 0.67 (3.78)
Social performance discrepancy (>0) .35 (4.15) 9.61 (5.62)
Historical (<0) * Social (<0) 41.65** (14.43)
Historical (<0) * Social (>0) −8.47 (16.79)
Historical (>0) * Social (<0) 129.95* (57.91)
Historical (>0) * Social (>0) −48.58 (26.17)
R² .02 .07 .17
N 1,750 1,750 1,750
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. R&D = research and development.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
Table 4
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of R&D Intensity Change, Continued
Variable Model 4
Constant −6.70 (5.20)
Number of employees 2009 (log) 0.55 (0.47)
Sector dummies Included
Region dummies Included
Historical performance discrepancy −7.38* (3.55)
Social performance discrepancy −3.60 (4.65)
R² .07
N 1,750
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. R&D = research and development.
*p < .05.
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To aid interpretation of Model 3, which includes interaction coefficients, the effect of per-
formance feedback on R&D intensity change is graphically displayed in Figure 1. Firm size 
(log of the number of employees in 2009) was held constant at its sample mean. Recall that 
the retail sector and North America were the reference categories for industry and region, 
respectively. In Model 3, the interaction coefficient for indicating a negative historical and 
negative social performance discrepancy (Configuration 1 in Table 1) proved to be significant. 
Figure 1 (the left backward portion in particular) shows that the more negative both of these 
performance–aspiration discrepancies would become (Configuration 1 in Table 1), the more 
R&D intensity would be increased, by up to 11 percentage points. This significant finding 
lends support to Hypotheses 1a and 1B, which are consistent with such an effect. Furthermore, 
the negative coefficient for consistently positive performance feedback (Configuration 4 in 
Table 1) also fits with these two baseline hypotheses but is not significant. Combined with the 
results in Models 2 and 4, this finding allows us to conclude that we confirm the baseline 
model to a substantial degree. More relevantly, in particular on the basis of the results of 
Model 3 as shown in Figure 1, we can conclude that the baseline model applies especially to 
situations in which performance feedback is consistent. This indicates the merit of accounting 
for the multiplicative effects of the two performance–aspiration discrepancies rather than 
Figure 1
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considering them in isolation, which has been common in the performance feedback literature. 
As these results demonstrate, that would obfuscate important and noteworthy effects of per-
formance feedback.
With regard to the effect of inconsistent performance feedback, the interaction coefficient 
for indicating a positive historical and negative social performance discrepancy (Configuration 
3 in Table 1) was also significant. As is visible in Figure 1, the greater the extent to which the 
two performance–aspiration comparisons are inconsistent in this direction (Configuration 3 
in Table 1), the more firms would decrease their level of R&D intensity, by up to 70 percent-
age points. In the contrasting inconsistent performance feedback situation (Configuration 2 
in Table 1), we did not find a significant effect on change in R&D intensity, though based on 
Figure 1, the direction of the effect seems to be the opposite of the other inconsistent perfor-
mance feedback situation.
This pattern of results does not fully fit any of the hypotheses we formulated on the impact 
of inconsistent performance feedback. Nevertheless, the one significant result does fit with 
the self-enhancing decision rule (Hypothesis 2b) yet contradicts the fire-alarm and affor-
dance-urgency rules (Hypotheses 2a and 3) that both predict an increase in R&D intensity in 
this situation (Configuration 3 in Table 1). However, full confirmation of the self-enhancing 
decision rule would require a similar finding for the other situation of inconsistent perfor-
mance feedback (Configuration 2 in Table 1), which, though not significant, points in the 
opposite direction. In the following section, we delve deeper into the theoretical implications 
of these findings and offer some suggestions for further study of inconsistent performance 
feedback.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper asked how (in)consistent performance feedback affects to what extent firms 
change their level of R&D investments. In particular, we looked at (in)consistency in perfor-
mance–aspiration discrepancies based on historical and social aspiration levels, which were 
the most commonly used performance feedback signals in the literature (Baum et al., 2005; 
Greve, 1998, 2003c). As inconsistent performance feedback is more ambiguous than consis-
tent performance feedback, deriving a clear conclusion as to whether the firm’s prior strate-
gies, routines, and structures are appropriate is harder to do. Studying the impact of 
(in)consistent performance feedback on changes in R&D investments is important since this 
serves to provide the firm with opportunities for innovation, which in turn increase its chances 
of surviving and thriving (Bowen et al., 2010; Crépon et al., 1998; Greve, 2003a). While 
innovation itself is not something under the direct control of the firm’s decision makers, the 
amount of resources spent on R&D is and thereby is an important strategy to bring about 
innovation to remedy performance shortfalls.
Our modeling approach was in line with a baseline model derived from received theory 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003c, 2010) and previous empirical work linking perfor-
mance feedback to R&D investment (W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a; 
Salge, 2011; Vissa et al., 2010). The baseline model indicates that the less favorably perfor-
mance compares against a historical (Hypothesis 1a) or social (Hypothesis 1B) aspiration 
level, the higher the level of adaptive behavior and thus the increase in R&D investments. 
With this baseline model in place, we were able to explore the extension to models 
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accounting for inconsistency in performance feedback. As displayed in Table 1, the baseline 
model results in contradictory predictions regarding the direction in which firms will change 
their R&D investments in case performance feedback is inconsistent (Configurations 2 and 3 
in Table 1).
Our results are to a large extent in accordance with the baseline model. In line with our 
expectations, the predictions derived from this model as stated in Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
applied most clearly to the two instances of consistent performance feedback (Configurations 
1 and 4 in Table 1). Moreover, it seems there is a mutually reinforcing negative effect of 
performance feedback derived from the historical and social aspiration levels in the case of 
consistently negative performance feedback (Configuration 1 in Table 1). This fits similar 
findings in earlier studies (Greve, 2008; Labianca, Fairbank, Andrevski, & Parzen, 2009) 
involving multiple types of performance indicators rather than distinct sources of perfor-
mance feedback signals, as we used. In introducing the need to go beyond considering per-
formance feedback signals in isolation, we stressed that they might have more than additive 
or independent effects. Our results clearly show these effects are multiplicative and thus 
should be considered jointly. With the baseline predictions not applicable to cases of contra-
dictory performance feedback (Configurations 2 and 3 in Table 1), expanding this baseline 
model with specific mechanisms and predictions to accommodate the impact of inconsis-
tency in performance feedback proved necessary.
Our most important theoretical contribution regards the introduction of the holistic con-
sideration theoretical mechanism as an alternative to the selective attention mechanism pre-
viously applied to explain the impact of inconsistent performance feedback on adaptive 
behavior. Based on the latter, scholars (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998; Jordan & Audia, 
2012) have proposed two diametrically opposed decision rules involving attention to a subset 
of the performance feedback signals to capture the process by which decision makers resolve 
the ambiguity introduced by inconsistent performance feedback (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 
1998; Jordan & Audia, 2012). On the one hand, the fire-alarm decision rule involves atten-
tion being directed to any negative performance feedback signal. On the other hand, a self-
enhancing decision rule involves attention being directed to any positive performance 
feedback signal. While the significant result for one of the instances of inconsistent perfor-
mance feedback (Configuration 3 in Table 1) was in line with the self-enhancing decision 
rule (Hypothesis 2b), the other one, though insignificant, pointed in a direction in line with 
the fire-alarm decision rule (Hypothesis 2a).
In our theoretical discussion of inconsistent performance feedback, we questioned the 
assumption that all instances of inconsistent performance feedback (Configurations 2 and 3 
in Table 1) will have the same effect on adaptive behavior underlying the selective attention 
mechanism. The results regarding inconsistent performance feedback indicate we were cor-
rect in doing so. As an alternative to the selective attention theoretical mechanism, we pro-
posed a holistic consideration theoretical mechanism. Inconsistent performance feedback is 
an ambiguous situation and might thus be a trigger for holistic consideration of the perfor-
mance feedback. As a result of such more detailed evaluation of the performance feedback, 
decision makers could in the end conclude that despite the inconsistency between the signals, 
in combination they yield a coherent interpretation. By introducing this alternative mecha-
nism, we recognized that a broader range of responses to inconsistent performance feedback 
can occur than the literature currently accounts for. Hence, we primarily contribute to the 
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literature on performance feedback and specifically to what impact inconsistency has on the 
performance feedback evaluation process.
The results do not corroborate the affordance-urgency decision rule (Hypothesis 3) we 
proposed involving holistic consideration of the performance feedback with regard to the 
opportunities and capabilities to increase R&D investments next to the common motivational 
effects (M. Chen et al., 2007; Greve, 1998, 2003c). Nevertheless, the fact that the impact on 
change in R&D intensity of the two inconsistent performance feedback instances is not uni-
formly positive or negative to us demonstrates that the idea of holistic consideration holds 
merit. Evidently, decision makers gave different interpretation to these instances of perfor-
mance feedback resulting in distinct effects on change in R&D intensity. Further theorizing 
and empirical study is required to fully understand the nature and impact of inconsistent 
performance feedback. A possible direction this could be taken in future research involves 
exploring to what extent prior knowledge, understanding of the industry circumstances, and 
past experience of the firm and its decision makers result in a particular holistic interpretation 
of inconsistent performance feedback (Gavetti et al., 2012). Given differences in these firm 
and decision maker characteristics, the nonfinding for one of the instances of inconsistent 
performance feedback (Configuration 2 in Table 1) in the current study could very well be 
explained. As problemistic search generally takes place not only in areas near the identified 
problem but also is more likely in more familiar areas (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003c; 
Vissa et al., 2010), accounting for such factors of between-firm heterogeneity seems a fruitful 
pursuit.
Our findings indicate that our attention to inconsistency in performance feedback is a 
valuable addition to the literature on organizational learning from performance feedback 
(Greve 2003c, 2010; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005; Lant et al., 1992; Lant & Shapira, 
2008; Milliken & Lant, 1991). We questioned the assumption that effects of distinct perfor-
mance feedback signals, a key source of information in strategic decision making, would be 
independent or simply additive. Our study shows reality is more complex and thereby under-
lines the need for understanding the qualities of multifaceted performance feedback. 
Moreover, we did so in relation to R&D investment, the most studied sort of search behavior 
(W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve 2003a; Salge, 2011; Vissa et al., 2010). As 
search behavior is the pathway to solutions firms can draw upon to improve performance, 
finding that firms will increase their R&D intensity only if both performance feedback sig-
nals are negative (see Figure 1 and Model 3 in Table 3) implies that engaging in search 
behavior is by no means a trivial step.
Future research could consider the impact of inconsistent performance feedback on other 
managerial and organizational behaviors previous research has shown to be affected by per-
formance feedback. For instance, the willingness to take risks could be considered. This, next 
to search behavior, is an important precursor to important strategic decisions, such as strate-
gic change and innovation adoption (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003c, 2010). It would be 
interesting to determine if the willingness to take risk following inconsistent performance 
feedback is greatly reduced (a self-enhancing response) or is driven by holistic consideration 
involving evaluation of the opportunities and capabilities to successfully take risks. In our 
theoretical discussion, we highlighted recent discussion on whether a strategic change can 
invariably be described as a risky one (Kacperczyk et al., in press). Our arguments demon-
strate that R&D investment should be conceptualized as problemistic search only. Future 
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research should also be nuanced in terms of whether the dependent variable under study is 
indicative of search and/or a risk. Even so, as innovation is a generally risky pursuit (March, 
1991; Massini, Lewin, & Greve, 2005), inconsistent performance feedback might dampen 
levels of firm innovation not only as a consequence of reducing R&D intensity but also by 
making it less likely decision makers accept the risk inherent in the options for innovation 
available to them. Following up on studies on inconsistent performance feedback and risk 
taking, the effect on eventual strategic decision making, for instance, pertaining to launching 
innovations, could be considered while accounting for its effects on search behavior (R&D) 
and willingness to take risks.
Our study is not without its limitations. For instance, the firms in our sample were among 
those that devote substantial resources to R&D since they were selected to be included in the 
2010 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard based on their high levels of R&D spend-
ing. This opens up the question whether our results apply to firms for which R&D is of less 
strategic importance. Hence, replication using a broader sample of firms combined with a 
panel data setup would serve to confirm and further expand upon the results of our study 
pertaining to inconsistent performance feedback. Our study was cross-sectional—even 
though data pertaining to performance feedback were lagged with respect to R&D intensity 
and change thereof—and hence we were unable to explore if effects of inconsistency might 
change over time. For instance, do firms that repeatedly face inconsistent performance feed-
back develop routines that allow them to single out those components of performance feed-
back in need of attention and act accordingly? Moreover, decision makers do use more than 
a single performance metric to evaluate their performance (Short & Palmer, 2003), and a 
variety of different metrics has been used in the empirical literature (Greve, 2003c, 2010). 
We used sales growth in our study but cannot confirm that this would be the most important 
metric with respect to determining R&D investment. Nevertheless, we did show that sales 
growth captures firm performance sufficiently to predict subsequent changes in R&D 
investments.
In conclusion, we show that inconsistency in performance feedback matters to search 
behavior as captured by changes made to R&D investments. Nevertheless, more theoretical 
and empirical effort is needed to provide and corroborate an exhaustive explanation for these 
phenomena.
Notes
1. A number of the studies just mentioned extend the linear baseline model by postulating that the strength of the 
relationship between performance–aspiration discrepancy and the magnitude of research-and-development (R&D) 
intensity differ for values below and above the aspiration level (W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 
2003a; Vissa, Greve, & Chen, 2010). As a result of risk tolerance and inertial pressures, a kinked-curve relationship 
emerges where R&D intensity would be more sensitive to performance feedback above than below the aspiration 
level. Nevertheless, empirical studies testing this model (W. Chen, 2008; W. Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a; 
Vissa et al., 2010) have failed to confirm it with regard to R&D intensity, and therefore we do not put forward any 
hypotheses derived from the kinked curve model.
2. In this paper, we look at inconsistency between a historical and a social aspiration level based on a single 
performance measure. Some of the studies (Audia & Brion, 2007; Greve, 2008) on multiple goals considered aspira-
tion levels based on two distinct performance criteria. Over and above the discussion on whether to devote greater 
attention to negative or positive performance–aspiration discrepancies, in such cases the ranking of different goal 
dimensions in terms of their importance plays a role. In order to isolate the effect of inconsistency from that of goal 
hierarchy, we consider the case in which both aspiration levels pertain to the same goal criterion.
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3. Audia and Brion (2007) also referred to these rules in relation to inconsistency between performance–aspira-
tion discrepancies on two different goal dimensions. Mezias, Chen, and Murphy (2002) used these rules as well in 
their study on aspiration updating though did not consider them in relation to inconsistency between performance–
aspiration discrepancies.
4. Non–European Union (EU) refers to the rest of the world, including other European countries that are not 
members of the EU (for instance, Switzerland, Norway, etc.).
5. In addition to these controls for region, we ran the model reported in this paper with an indicator variable 
distinguishing firms headquartered in an EU country from those that were not. We found that this did not impact 
the level of change in R&D intensity, nor did it change any of the findings reported in this paper. These models are 
available from the authors upon request.
6. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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